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Survival of the Fittest: The Evolution of Frauds in Uganda’s Mobile Money Market (Part-I)

Uganda has seen an explosive growth in mobile money adoption in the last few years, growing from 550,000 active users in 2009 to 5.2 million in 2012 (active on a 30-day basis) according to the Economic Regulation Unit’s Broadcasting & Telecommunications Market Review 2011/12. Now, the rate of mobile money account ownership outstrips bank account ownership, which stood at 3.6 million bank accounts in 2013.

However, the Uganda mobile money market has been a playground for fraudsters. Reportedly, on an average at least 100 mobile money users lose money every week, some lose millions of shillings. In an environment where there are 5.2 million active users, 5,200 cases of fraud per annum do not seem to be a very high prevalence. But many cases are likely to go unreported, and each and every case will be amplified by word of mouth and undermines trust in the mobile money system.  The 2013 Agent Network Accelerator survey for Uganda conducted by The Helix Institute of Digital Finance highlighted that the “risk of fraud” and “dealing with customer services when something goes wrong” were the two biggest challenges faced by agents. See “Challenges to Agency Business – Evidence from Tanzania and Uganda (Part- I)” for discussion of this.

We have already outlined the nature of many mobile money frauds and presented a generic framework broadly based on the Kenya market to understand these and their evolution with the maturation of the mobile money market – see Fraud in Mobile Financial Services. However, the Uganda market evolved differently to the Kenyan one, with multiple players entering the market over time and, most importantly, no national ID. These factors modified the evolution and sequencing of frauds, and in this blog, I highlight the six most common agent/customer level frauds in Uganda. The blog draws on my five years of my personal experience in the mobile money business in Uganda with Warid and Airtel during which I keenly observe the evolution of the mobile money market. As Zonal and then Regional Manager, I was able to watch and discuss frauds with agents across the country – indeed responding to fraud was a key part of my work.

The approaches to fraud executed by the con-men demonstrate their thorough understanding of the mobile money system and the lacuna in the processes in place. While the regulators and MNOs were busy fixing the leaks in the systems and processes, the fraudsters also learned and evolved their modus operandi to find new ways to cheat mobile money agents and customers. Their fraud mechanisms have become more sophisticated over the years.

In Uganda, the fundamental underlying problem is the country’s weak KYC norms. Currently, anyone can obtain a SIM(s) in different names and can operate under different identities.  This phenomenon is compounded by the lack of a national ID in Uganda. The registration process for a national ID just started 2 months ago. The typical identifications for KYC have been either a passport, work ID or local council ID. The latter is most common, yet easily obtained by fraudsters and in as many distinct copies as they want, typically by paying the local council leader a small sum of money (usually ranging between $ 2-3). The ease of securing a fake local council ID for SIM and mobile money KYC registration makes it difficult to trace fraudsters, Such SIM cards are registered for purposes of committing fraud and quickly thrown away after successfully achieving their purpose/objective.

So how has fraud evolved, manifested and become sophisticated in the DFS space 0f Ugandan market?

1.       Fake currency

During initial years the fraudsters took advantage of the low level of awareness by customers and agents through the use of counterfeit money to defraud unsuspecting victims. Fraudsters targeted busy agents in high traffic areas who did not perform due diligence in monitoring counterfeits, and in turn, agents also passed this fake currency to unsuspecting customers. Soon, agents became vigilant and many started to use ultra-violet lighting rods to detect fake currencies, resulting in a drastic decline with this tactic.

2.       Reversing “erroneous” transactions

Fraudsters then resorted to sending fake SMS messages to customers’ phones (alerting the customer of a P2P/cash in transaction on his mobile money wallet). Shortly thereafter, the fraudster would call the customer claiming to have erroneously sent money to a wrong customer number. Innocently, and before checking the balance on his mobile money wallet, the customer would make a P2P transaction to reverse the “erroneously sent money” from his account – thus losing money. This did not stop with registered customers, un-registered customers would also fall prey of the fake SMS and “send back” the erroneous money through OTC at the agent point. The fraudsters had a field day with this tactic.

In a bid to protect their customers, MNOs run above the line (ATL) campaigns and to send SMSs broadcasts to educate customers on how to differentiate between authenticated messages from mobile money payment systems and fake ones sent by fraudsters. Although this had moderate success, it called for the change of tactics from fraudsters.

3.       Facilitation fees for winners of the prize draw

The next evolution saw fraudsters introducing yet another tactic, this time using the MNOs’ marketing and advertising strategies to their advantage. Between 2010 and 2012, the Ugandan telecom sector was witnessing fierce fights for supremacy in revenue, customer acquisition, and retention. There were price wars, bonuses on airtime top-up and special prizes under loyalty programmes that included motor vehicles, bikes, money, etc. Winners would be called through telephone calls asking them to pick up their prizes.

The fraudsters responded quickly by creating their own “call centers”. Posing as staff from the MNO, they would call customers informing them that they were lucky winners and should come quickly to redeem their prizes. However, the fraudsters requested the customer (their “lucky winner”) to make an initial deposit of mobile money to facilitate the process of hand over of the prize, this would range from $45 to $400 depending on the magnitude of the “prize won”. For a motor vehicle, the “facilitation fee” would increase up to $1,000. Excited customers would quickly send this “facilitation fee” to a mobile money account provided to them by the fraudsters, only to wait in vain for the prize. On checking with the MNO, customers would then realize that they had been defrauded and the mobile money number to which they had sent the “facilitation fee”, had been switched off with no trace of ownership.

MNOs responded by ATL campaigns to increase awareness of their office phone numbers through which winners would be contacted. These numbers were publicized through TV, radio, newspapers and trade materials. Customer’s awareness of this fraud tactic increased and soon there was a drastic drop in its use.

4.       PIN Appropriation

Fraudsters were still thinking and soon introduced a new wave of fraud targeting mobile money agents – specifically those that were busy and highly liquid.  It was common practice for busy agents to initiate a transaction and then hand over his phone to the customer to punch in his number. The customer would give the phone back to the agent to complete the transaction by inserting in his PIN code.

Fraudsters took advantage of this. They would go to the agent point as normal customers wanting to conduct a transaction and followed the usual process. During this time, the fraudsters studied the buttons the agent pressed for his PIN code. After a few visits to the agent, the fraudsters could usually identify the agent’s PIN codes. The fraudster then went to the agent to transact. This time when the agent handed over his phone to the “customer”, the fraudster quickly punched in a phone number, inserted the agent’s PIN code and completed the transaction. The fraudster then started another transaction to cover his tracks and handed the phone back to the agent to complete it. The fraudster then walked away … never to come back. The agent was not aware that two transactions had taken place on his phone and had lost money ranging from $500 – $1,500.

Again MNOs had to intervene and they conducted awareness campaigns targeting agents advising them to:

  1. Make an end to end transaction by themselves and avoid customer contact with agents’ phones
  2. Keep the PIN codes safer and better still frequently change them to avoid anyone studying them
  3. Check and record their balance after every transaction is completed
  4. Record all transactions done so that a trail can be made
  5. Call helpline as soon as the loss of money is detected

These awareness campaigns forced fraudsters to adopt more sophisticated methods that required patience and careful study of the behavior of both customer and agents.

5.    SIM Replacement

Fraudsters now study behaviors of customers and agents to find out those who carelessly expose their PIN codes. The fraudsters do not need to get in contact with the customer or agent’s phone, all they need is the phone number and PIN codes of the customer or agent.

MNOs provide a four-figure PIN code when activating a mobile money account for security purposes. Yet customers and agents usually (perhaps for fear of forgetting their PIN codes), chose to have a similar 4 figure PIN code, for instance choosing to use the classic 1234 or 4444, 2222, 5555, or 1111. See Ignacio Mas’ excellent blog “My PIN is 4321” on this. This makes it easy for them to memorize the PIN at all times. They continue to use this simple PIN without changing it (even when advised by MNOs to frequently change their PIN codes), thus making the fraudster’s work easy. Once he knows these PIN codes, through guessing or observation, the fraudster gets a duplicate ID issued in his name. He then goes to a police station to report the loss of “his/her” SIM, for which he gets a police letter. He presents this police letter to the MNO’s customer care center and a replacement SIM is provided thus inactivating the original, correct SIM. As the fraudster knows the PIN code of the target customer or agent, he is able to withdraw the money using the replacement SIM.

MNOs are facing a challenge with this tactic because the police innocently provide a letter for loss of a SIM (of course fraudulently obtained), so it is their obligation to provide a replacement SIM. Interrogating the MNO’s database for information to confirm KYC information provided at the time of registration is an option. But this is often inadequate to ascertain if the customer seeking a new SIM is genuine because the fraudsters have done his homework well and are well equipped with relevant information of their target victim. The relevant information and frequently verified include the customers’ date of birth, parents name and next of kin – upon this information matching with that of the MNO’s database (for proof and authentication purposes), a replacement SIM is issued to the fraudster who goes on to defraud innocent customers.

6.       Reversals

In the latest round of frauds, the fraudsters have targeted the MNOs’ processes for the reversal of money sent to wrong mobile money accounts by customers and agents. Its common practice for money sent to the wrong recipient, to be sent back to the source account (after the MNO has received the complaint and done its due diligence investigation).

Fraudsters now go to a merchant to purchase an item for which they propose to pay using mobile money. Once the fraudsters have transferred the money to effect the payments, they leave the shop with the item and then call the MNO’s customer care center and ask them to block and reverse the payment on the basis that it was a wrong transaction. The MNO (following set reversal procedures) blocks the merchant’s account or the amount in a debate, then listens to both parties. However, the merchant in many cases has no proof that he is the genuine recipient and will be asked go ahead and settle the dispute legally. Clearly, this is not an ideal solution for a busy shopkeeper, and with the prospects of repeated visits to the MNO or lawyers for a reversal, he is left with no option but to agree to the transaction.

This blog examined the evolution of customer/agent-level fraud in Uganda by examining the six most common frauds in the market. In the next blog, we will examine how the MNOs have responded to the activities of fraudsters and how they might strengthen that response.

Upscaling MFIs into MSME Financing

A larger number of microfinance institutions across the globe have realised the business potential of MSME financing. As the next big strategic move many of these MFIs plan to upscale to MSME financing. However, this strategic shift is filled with numerous challenges. This video talks about these challenges in preview of key business parameters of operations, marketing, financing and capacity building. The video ends with recommendations and a way forward.

Is There a Magic Stick to Manage Delinquencies? 

Delinquency is a systemic issue in microfinance institutions, once it is detected a through system review is needed. There are few quick measures which can give immediate relief, if problem is detected at an early stage. However, system overhaul is essential to find long term solution. This video talks about general perception of MFIs regarding Delinquency Management and MSC’s experience working on Delinquency Management with one of its client in Sri Lanka.

NBFC-MFIs as business correspondents – What will it take?

In the blog “NBFC-MFIs As Business Correspondents – Who Benefits? Part-I” we highlighted the range of benefits for both NBFC-MFIs and banks in arrangements under which NBFC-MFIs operate as BCs for banks. In“NBFC-MFIs As Business Correspondents – Who Benefits? Part-II” we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the model for NBFC-MFIs.

But of course, the devil is in the details. So what will it take to make this happen in a way that is mutually beneficial for both MFIs and banks?

Built on years of experience of supporting MFIs (including some mass market market-focused banks) to plan for and operate as agent network managers, here is MicroSave’s step-by-step guide:

  1. Understand what you are getting into

There are four ways in which MFIs participate in a digital financial ecosystem. These include:

  • Building a digital financial system on its own (not a real option in India!).
  • Act as an agent/agent network manager for an e-money issuer (usually a bank or an MNO).
  • Using an established digital payments system (for example an MNO-run mobile money network) to deliver its own products and services.
  • Using mobile phones as an information sourcing (for example client enrolment and loan origination) and sharing mechanism (for example on repayments due and made) and for other non-cash purposes.
MicroSave will soon run its “Digital Financial Services for MFIs” workshop in India to assist interested institutions to set up DFS initiatives for NBFC-MFIs (if you are interested to pre-register please send a mail to Garimasingh@MicroSave.net). The workshop provides insights into the costs and benefits of digital financial service adoption in the context of microfinance and assesses the capability of individual MFIs to successfully rollout digital financial services. It will also provide useful information with regard to the opportunities and challenges of digital financial services for MFIs.
  1. Conduct analysis to assess demand and supply-side readiness

Conduct a baseline qualitative assessment to gauge the initial capabilities and ground situation of your MFI on key aspects that will have a direct bearing on the success of your efforts to effect the significant changes that participating in a digital financial ecosystem will entail:

  • Willingness of the client base to switch to digital financial services (DFS) channel to conduct loan repayment and savings deposit/withdrawal transactions. It will also seek to understand the extent of the processes that the clients will be comfortable adopting under the DFS channel. Essentially you will need to be able to answer all the questions highlighted in MicroSave Briefing Note # 101 Mobile Money – Questions That Your Clients Will Ask You.
  • Mobile literacy among the client base: to understand the mobile phone usage pattern and the level of comfort and acceptance in using various functions of a mobile phone among different client segments.
  • Institutional capacity assessment: to gauge the level of preparedness of the institution to adopt DFS-enabled operations. This will take into account staff’s understanding and level of comfort with DFS transactions, their opinions on client acceptance of DFS as a channel for loan transactions, back-end systems and staff skill capacities to manage DFS-enabled operations.

Supply-side assessment of the local DFS market: to gain a quick understanding of the various DFS solutions available in the states where your MFI operates and which of the available ones can be the best fit; also assess the capacity of the existing available DFS agent networks in terms of liquidity management, spread and density of agents to serve your client base.

  1. Conduct detailed strategic planning and financial modeling

Using the findings of the baseline assessment, the MFI should organize a workshop involving key personnel from each department and associated consultants. Representatives from potential DFS providers should also be invited to discuss possible terms of engagement – see MicroSave India Focus Note 80  Driving Viability for Banks and BCs. This workshop will aim to draw a detailed strategy for the pilot project and also to use the platform to communicate the idea to all the departments. The deliverables at the end of the workshop would be, but not limited to:

   4.    Operationalize agent network management

The cost and complexity of building and managing a sustainable cash-in/cash-out (CICO) agent network across a broad geography is consistently under-estimated by providers across the globe. MFIs will experience additional challenges not least of all because their processes are credit-focused and banks are likely to outline (but not detail) a series of process that their risk management/statutory compliance departments will require. In addition, MFIs may struggle to assess the risks involved in both the delivery of a wider range of products and in the use of digital channels to do so.

MicroSave’s Agent Network Accelerator project works with agent network managers in eight leading markets across the world to understand address many of these challenges.

Key decisions required from MFIs acting as BCs will include:

To get a really good handle on this, ideally MFIs should send participants to attend The Helix Institute of Digital Finance’s Core Agent Network Accelerator training workshop. This course is invariably hugely over-subscribed so if you want to pre-register, please contact Annabel@MicroSave.net.

How you will manage customer service and satisfaction – MicroSave Briefing Notes #129 & 130 Customer Support for E/M-Banking Users and Customer Service Through Call Centres .

  1. Plan, implement, monitor and evaluate a pilot-test

This phase will be focussed on establishing all the back-end systems and HR resources necessary for the rollout of the pilot phase. The key tasks during this phase will be the following:

  • BC Transformation Planning and Change Management – building on the strategic business plan’s KOGMA analysis, including a detailed timeline of major activities and roles/activities assigned to individual staff/ consultants.
  • Finalization of contracts with the mobile money (DFS) providers: The MFI will finalize the services to be availed/delivered and the applicable pricing/revenue/ commission systems with the DFS provider/banks. The resulting contract should describe in detail, among others: Each entity’s roles and responsibilities in the project,
  • Method and payment mode of commission/ revenue,

  • Service quality of software/ hardware platforms (service level agreement), and back-end support structure.

A detailed project implementation plan describing timelines and corresponding deliverables, etc. will be drafted jointly with the selected DFS/bank entity to ensure timely execution of the project activities. In addition, unless it is able to piggy-back on existing “pay bill” functions of providers, the MFI may need a separate USSD code. This will require careful negotiation with the MNOs.

  • Negotiation and contracting with IT providers, installation of the IT Module: In addition to DFS providers, software providers will also be listed to identify the solution provider for the IT platform the MFI will require for reconciling the DFS transactions on its back-end systems.
  • Decision on the selection criteria, and selection of branches for the pilot project.
  • Setting targets: both quantitative and qualitative to allow assessment and evaluation of the pilot and define criteria for judging its success (or failure) and thus avoid pilot-test decision drift!
  • Detailed definition of the processes and assessment of the attendant operational risks for the digital financial services that will be provided – including a detailed approach to the management of these risks to optimize the risk-efficiency trade-offs. See MicroSave Briefing Note # 115 Process Mapping for Mobile Banking Initiatives.
  • Definition of the marketing & communication strategy to promote uptake and usage of the new digital channel by end-users. See the MMT/MicroSave webinar on Marketing E/M-Banking Services for an overview of the issues and opportunities for addressing them.
  • Training of staff: on both the digital finance channel and how it changes their roles and responsibilities and on how they will market it to end-users.
  • Establishment of the monitoring systems and evaluation team for the pilot project.

If all this looks complex, it is. Moving to a digitally enable system will require detailed planning and painstakingly detailed execution, including a significant change management process.

But help is at hand, MicroSave has years of experience of work on exactly these issues with banks and MFIs across Asia, Africa, and Latin America – including in India itself where we have worked with or are working with the four largest mobile network operators; banks including HDFC, Axis ICICI, State Bank of India, Punjab National Bank and Bank of India; agent network managers including Eko, FINO, SAVE, Oxigen and many others; and MFIs including KGFS, Cashpor, Grameen Koota and Arohan.

Click here for more information on our DFS Capability Statement and Agent Network Management for MFIsbrochure or contact us on info@MicroSave.net.

Agent Network Accelerator Survey: Nigeria Country Report 2014

After years of market development, digital finance in Nigeria has still yet to take-off.  The market is still experiencing some regulatory impediments, but most of all, providers need improved strategic approaches to their anchor products, core operations and expansion strategies.

The principle of doing things right the first time (DRIFT) is essential. Despite the great potential in Nigeria, core agency functions are currently run with very limited resources, and there is an emphasis on quantity rather than quality.

Read the full report here 

Every successful launch first needs a launchpad: Opportunities for agent banking in nigeria

Five years after the passage of the 2009 Regulatory Framework for Mobile Payment Services by The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), digital finance (mobile money/agent banking) has still yet to take-off in Nigeria.  A nationally representative survey of Nigerians, conducted by InterMedia in 2013, found that only 0.01% of Nigerians have a mobile money account.  Critics note regulation in the country prohibits telecoms from taking the lead in the roll-out of digital finance as they have in East Africa, and suggest the lack of progress is due to their lack of involvement.  Banks like EcoBank, and FirstBank, (as well as third party providers like Paga), are left leading the charge but are still plagued by some fundamental issues.

The Helix Institute of Digital Finance recently finished qualitative research on work being done around the country, and the ironic finding is that the issue is not a lack of initiative by providers, it is that they are doing so much that they do not have the bandwidthhttps://www.microsave.net/helix-institute/ to it strategically.  Providers have jumped to try to scale quickly without first sitting and designing processes, structuring management, and giving clarity to their value proposition.  Once these tasks have been completed, the focus becomes scale, and here telecoms have a big advantage because they already have more customers, large marketing teams and budgets, and extensive experience in network development and distribution. However, scale is not the primary problem in Nigeria right now, it is the lack of strategic clarity that results from skipping this first developmental stage, which we term as the “Launchpad Stage”.

Agents & Products Everywhere, but Quality & Strategy Limited

On the product front, providers are engaged in G2P payment programs in rural Nigeria, they are offering bill pay opportunities in urban areas, airtime top-ups on the handset, and advertising P2P payments on national television.  However, robust market research and sophisticated customer segmentation has not been done to ensure that products are positioned for the right customers.  This is leading to market confusion, where the average Nigerian is still very unsure what digital finance is, and how it solves a pressing problem for them.

In September 2013, the Central Bank of Nigeria reported 67,494 agents had been on-boarded by providers, while The Gates Foundation did a census of financial service touch points that year found only 3,275 mobile money agents (5%), indicating extremely high levels of inactivity in agent networks.  The Helix research confirmed that agents are reporting very low revenues, are frustrated with the lack of quality of provider support, and are unclear how they are supposed to pitch the growing arsenal of products to customers. Dissatisfied or dormant agents, together with the high levels of system down time in Nigeria, are undermining trust in digital financial services.

Providers are desperately dealing with angry agents, while trying to sell a wide range of different services, leaving them to triage a battery of operational challenges without bandwidth for strategic progress.

Starting Small is the Key to Growing Big

The great irony of digital finance is that the overall business model depends on large scales of customers and volumes of transactions served by tens of thousands of agents, however, those who ignite this flame of growth too soon, get caught dashing around to control its burn as its increasing scale compounds small problems until they become crippling issues.

The key to successfully growing big is starting small with a ‘Launchpad Stage’ which focuses on quality NOT quantity first.  It should involve only a maximum of few hundred agents, with the objective of defining the anchor product, and streamlining all processes and protocols.  In a large country like Nigeria, it should have a geographic focus.  It should not include master agents, super agents, or aggregators.  Those are tools for management of networks at scale, and bringing them in too early will only leave them lurking around the business model trying to find profits that only come in to existence later when scale is introduced.

M-PESA in Kenya had a ‘Launchpad Stage that is not often acknowledged.  In started in 2005, and lasted for about two years.  It was run as a pilot with only eight agents and about 500 customers, and the focus was on learning and gathering information to improve the quality of the service, and the clarity of the value proposition.  This was an essential process, as they ended up entirely changing their value proposition from a microfinance solution to a person to person (P2P) transfer service.   This Launchpad phase allowed them to solve problems while they were still small, and then scale solutions to them strategically as they sequenced in agent infrastructure to support it.

Advice for Pioneering Banks

Unfortunately skipping the Launchpad Stage, is a common oversight. However, by now many Nigeria providers should have a treasure trove a data they can mine to figure out which products have been used by which customer segments, and use this data to help them complete this first stage of development.  Since the Launchpad Stage does not involve scale, banks should be equally apt at completing it successfully as the telecoms.  Banks, however, have different initial sources of strengths than telecoms, which they will first want to leverage.

Generally in all developing world countries, a telecom will have an order of magnitude more customers than the bank. However, that is not relevant in the Launchpad Stage.  Banks need to first focus on their strengths, and in terms of finding a value proposition for customers, and the large ones will want to start with the customers they already have.  Banks may have mostly served upper class clients for hundreds of years, but those clients run companies making and receiving an alluring number and value of payments.  Help them send those streams of salaries, bill and retail payments to mobile wallets.  GSMA MMU showed that bulk payments were the fastest growing product in 2013. Direct the lower value customers crowding the banking halls out to the agents, thus legitimizing and building trust in the system and business for the agents.

Telecoms also have the advantage of large airtime distribution networks they can convert into cash-in/cash-out agents.  However, this is also a secondary issue that becomes relevant when scaling.  The Launchpad Stage is just for selecting your first few hundred agents, and developing an arsenal of processes, checks and balances around them.  Many banks have a great way to do this too; the small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) customers banks have can make great agents.  This is what bKash did to recruit their first few hundred agents, and where other banks we have worked with as well have started.

Telecoms are designed for scale, and have many advantages over banks for achieving it, but pursuing scale is a secondary activity after the value proposition has been developed and core processes have been designed and tested in the Launchpad Stage.  Banks are not at a disadvantage when designing a launchpad, and they should look to some of their existing core strengths to execute this phase effectively.  This is where many banks across the globe driving for scale are stuck and they probably need to stop to do a strategy refresh along the lines of what is being suggested above.

We will address the issues of scaling effectively in a future blog.

 

To read our ‘Agent Network Accelerator Survey – Nigeria Country Report 2014‘ in full click here

To read our ‘Agent Network Accelerator Survey – Kenya Country Report 2013‘ in full click here

To read our ‘Agent Network Accelerator Survey – Tanzania Country Report 2013‘ in full click here

To read our ‘Agent Network Accelerator Survey – Uganda Country Report 2013′ in full click here