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Market readiness for mobile money interoperability

Interoperability of mobile financial services potentially offers great benefits for the wider ecosystem. The value to consumers is obvious. This, in turn, leads to wider adoption; higher transaction volumes; greater velocity of money in the ecosystem; all of which are advantageous to service providers. It is now well established from both MicroSave’s Helix Institute of Digital Finance and CGAP studies that non-exclusive agents transact and earn more than exclusive agents. For the regulators, this translates to the reduction in cash; expansion of the formal financial economy and a direct impact on advancing financial inclusion.

The launch of M-PESA in Kenya in 2007 catalyzed a worldwide ‘mobile money movement’ and as services have proliferated, the pressure to create interoperable mobile money systems has mounted. Today, the development of an interoperable mobile money ecosystem is a prevailing need. During 2014, 9 mobile network operator groups (Bharti Airtel, Etisalat, Millicom, MTN, Ooredoo, Orange, STC, Vodafone, and Zain), have pledged to offer interoperable mobile money services across Africa and the Middle East. The question of interoperability is no longer of if, but of when.

Interoperability crosses many levels. For example, access or channel interoperability, service interoperability, and cross-sector interoperability. The below table provides examples of levels and their enablers:

From the consumers’ perspective, interoperability means more convenient and efficient services. Interoperability also has a key role to play in advancing financial inclusion.Furthermore, one of the main barriers to mobile money adoption cited amongst customers in Africa and Asia is related to the inability to send and receive money irrespective of provider. Many factors, including market conditions, will dictate how and when interoperability graduates from the very basic to eventually reach a state of full interoperability. Agent or channel interoperability can be introduced relatively easily, with low investments and mainly through regulations. Although, the key barrier is to bring competing market players together to offer even the simplest form of interoperability. Higher levels of interoperability(often referred to as account-to-account interoperability) need bilateral or multilateral agreements; investments in technology capabilities to integrate services across providers; and implementation of common risk management practices. These are more complex to implement.

Even the simplest kind of channel interoperability in the form of agent sharing has a significant bearing on consumer experience and agent income. Apart from the convenience of improved access and networks effects, it increases market competition and therefore enables the resultant benefits in terms of lower tariffs, better service quality, and greater consumer centricity. In most markets, the dominant player would tend to resist even a rudimentary form of interoperability, for fear (often unfounded) of losing out, even though the strategy is rather expensive and difficult to execute. The introduction of the non-exclusivity of agents in Kenya is a welcomed step and early signs of impact are already evident. Reserve Bank of India, the central bank in India, has been toying with the idea of white labeled agents (business correspondents), that can be a channel for any service provider.

Account to account interoperability is more complex and has major implications for the service providers. There are multiple models through which account-to-account interoperability can be implemented. The easier forms are bilateral arrangements between providers. The more complex forms are multilateral arrangements; common processing entity with or without commercial interests; or arrangements through automated clearing houses (ACH).  India, through IMPS system, provides a great example of infrastructure built to allow payments to be made across multiple MNOs and banks.  Interoperability between platforms and services can be a costly endeavor and could, in fact, make mobile money services more expensive to the consumer. This can be offset once network effects come into play and volumes pick up, leading to economies of scale.

Yet, interoperability is not such a straightforward issue. Some would argue that if market interoperability happens too early, there is a risk of stalling mobile money movement before it even starts. At inception, it is a matter of significant investments with limited returns. Unless global standards evolve and network effects occur quickly, interoperability can be a barrier for the first movers in the market to invest. We have witnessed with Safaricom in Kenya, MTN in Uganda and Vodacom in Tanzania that return on investment typically takes between 5-6 years from the launch of service. These operators became profitable without interoperability. It might be argued that the lack of interoperability did, in fact, enable profitability. Without interoperability between service platforms, the cost of offering mobile money and running out of e-money is enhanced because non-exclusive agents have to hold a separate float for each provider. In Uganda, agents turn away, on an average, 3 transactions per day for want of float; in Tanzania, they turn away 5 transactions each day, dissatisfying customers and negatively impacting their bottom lines. A layer of complexity does get added to the agents’ business model as they will be managing e-money floats between different providers, instead of just one.

Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania are advanced mobile money markets. Interoperability makes sense in these countries, where there are multiple providers, most of whom have experienced the business benefits of offering mobile money products; and enough customers and transactions to not consider interoperability as a threat but an enabler to commercial business.

Even though Kenya is one of the most mature markets, interoperability has only recently come to pass in the form of agent sharing. For years, Safaricom reigned supreme over the mobile money kingdom, despite there being 5 other providers. Safaricom’s M-Pesa service still controls circa 67% of the Kenyan mobile money market, partly due to its early agent exclusivity arrangement, which is no longer in place and was formally outlawed in July. The Central Bank of Kenya ordered Safaricom to open up the M-PESA agent network to other operators in a bid to improve fair competition and encourage lower fees for customers. It will certainly be easier to achieve interoperability when the providers’ market shares are more even as in Tanzania (Vodacom 35%, Airtel 31%, Tigo 31% and Zantel 12%) than in markets with one predominant player (as in Uganda or Kenya).

Safaricom did have the first mover advantage in Kenya, but invested significantly in building and maintaining an extensive and robust agent network, so it’s no wonder that they may feel they are being treated inequitably now that competitors can simply use any of the agents they nurtured. For that reason, pioneers in other markets may feel disadvantaged too.

In any case, the initial cost and lower revenues that may result from interoperability are short terms. Taking a long-term view, interoperability can prove to be very beneficial to all the stakeholders. Historically, when interoperability has been introduced in the world of payments, be it with ATMs, credit or debit cards, huge growth and adoption have followed suit. Global standards for interoperable mobile money services will go a long way in presenting greater value to first movers and early adopters in the emerging markets. Just as standards like the ISO 8583 enable debit and credit cards at any ATM to transact with any bank around the world, it is desirable that similar standards are established for connecting mobile money services and making them interoperable.

Bangladesh Pioneering Unique Models & Innovations for Agent Networks

Earlier this year, The Helix Institute of Digital Finance conducted a nationally representative survey of 2,800 mobile money agents in Bangladesh, coupled with qualitative interviews across the country. The 2014 Bangladesh Country Report provides insights into some of the unique models and innovative techniques players in this country have designed to develop an agent network of approximately 160,000 agents in under four years (given  bKash reports 80,000 agents and our findings are that  50% of agents in the market serve bKash).

Unique Leadership in the Market: No Telecoms

The report finds that bKash —a third party provider majority owned by BRAC Bank Ltd, managed by Money in Motion LLC with equity investments from The International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Gates Foundation—dominates the digital financial services space with 50% of the agents offering their services.  They are followed by the Dutch Bangla Bank Ltd. (DBBL—28%), United Commercial Bank Ltd. (UCash- 14%) and Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd. (mCash – 6%).

Beyond the burgeoning competitive landscape in Bangladesh, it is intriguing that none of the above players are telecoms.  Thus far we have seen the majority of the success in the digital finance space lead by telecoms who have large marketing budgets, national networks of retailors already serving them, and usually tens of millions of customers they can entice to register for digital finance.  In Bangladesh the regulation stipulates that telecoms are not allowed to brand their own digital finance services, which has given the opportunity to banks and third party providers like bKash.  This is strong evidence that players other than telecoms can scale agent networks in digital finance.

Distinctive Agency Demographics: Non-dedicated and Male

The different types of institutions leading market growth in Bangladesh are also making distinctive decisions about the demographics of their agent network.   In Bangladesh almost all agents (96%) have pre-existing, parallel businesses in addition to the digital finance service they provide (they are “non- dedicated” to the DFS business). As the below chart shows, this is very different to the leading DFS markets in East Africa, where many more agents are completely dedicated to the DFS business.  Generally, these types of agents can only exist in markets where transactions per day and therefore profits are relatively high, which therefore sustain the entire business.  Hence we might see a move towards more dedicated professional agents, if profits increase in Bangladesh in the future.  Another difference worth highlighting, is that while the majority of agents across East Africa are female, in Bangladesh 100% are male.  More research will have to be done to uncover both the drivers and the implications for customer uptake and usage of this gender difference.

Different Business Model Viability: Low Transactions and Profits

Median monthly profitability ($51) as compared to the leading East African Countries is low, and is a result of low transactions per day for agents.  However, 96% of agents are profitable, driven by very low median operational costs. When asked what the biggest barrier is to conducing more transactions, agents most commonly cited there are too many other agents competing for business, which is often an indication that focus must be shifted towards acquiring more customers, and encouraging them to transact more often.

Innovation: Liquidity Management

Bangladeshi service providers have created an innovative system to tackle the prevalent issue of liquidity management.  Most agents have their cash and electronic float delivered to them at their outlets, mainly by a ‘runner’ who is an employee of master agent (referred to locally as a distributor or aggregator).  As a result, the frequency of rebalancing (both cash deposits and withdrawals) is higher in Bangladesh than in East Africa. In Kenya, for example, agents do a median of just four cash deposits and three cash withdrawals per month as compared to a median of 12 cash deposits and ten withdrawals in Bangladesh.  As a result, Bangladeshi agents report denying a median of zero transactions daily due to lack of liquidity, in comparison, Tanzanian agents deny a median of five transactions each day, which is equal to 14% of their median daily transactions.

Summary: The Market View

Bangladesh is showing impressive results, and is finding unique ways of achieving them given the different operating environment there compared to those of the pioneers in East Africa.  There are definitely some challenges ahead in terms of increasing transactions and therefore profits at the agent level.  However, it is also important to note that with a liquidity management system that rebalances on demand, and agent demographics where almost everyone has a core business operating in parallel to the digital finance services they are providing, this might be much less important than it is in East Africa.  Further, many transactions in Bangladesh are done over the counter (OTC) and therefore only partially captured by the above statistics.  While this means the transactions and profits might be higher in Bangladesh this OTC system usually does not involve the required KYC verification, is not permitted, and therefore represents much more of a risk to the growth and functionality of the system than profits.  This topic will be discussed in future blogs.

Agent Network Accelerator Survey – Bangladesh Country Report 2014

Bangladesh has created many unique systems for agent network management which are yielding world-class results especially with regards to liquidity management.  However, transaction volumes and profits are low compared to East Africa and support structures are still developing.

The research is based on 2,490 nationally representative agent interviews, carried out between March and April 2014. This is the largest research into agent networks carried out in the country, and reveals many exciting, cutting-edge operational insights into agent network management in the country.

To read through the report, please click here.

Insurance Product for Contractual MSE Workers of India – Behavioural Insights

Taking cue from the earlier Focus note on need of insurance for contractual MSE workers of India, a team from MicroSave conducted behavioural research around the preference and choice of the clients for insurance products and services. This note details the research process, assumptions and broad behavioural insights generated through the research. The note culminates into conceptualisation of a low fidelity product concept designed using user centred design approaches.

Taking cue from the earlier Focus note on need of insurance for contractual MSE workers of India, a team from MicroSave conducted behavioural research around the preference and choice of the clients for insurance products and services. This note details the research process, assumptions and broad behavioural insights generated through the research. The note culminates into conceptualisation of a low fidelity product concept designed using user centred design approaches.

Insurance for Contractual Workers of Micro and Small Enterprises in India – A Conscience Call

We applied a behavioural lens to examine why many clients do not save in accounts that MFIs open as business correspondents (BCs) of a bank. We found that a typical MFI is positioned (viewed in the market by their clients) as a credit service provider and, as such, MFIs do not fit into clients’ mental models of where to save. We discuss how MFIs can turn this situation around using client’s demand for credit and desire to accumulate lump sums as triggers to induce active savings behaviour through MFI-BCs. Such a change in product strategy will require MFIs to focus on branding themselves as savings service providers and to highlight their relationships with respected commercial banks to build trust. MFIs will have to be cautious not to position these savings services as a compulsory requirement, as part of loan insurance or at risk of offset against unpaid credit balances.

How Can BC-MFIs Tap Household Savings?

We applied a behavioural lens to examine why many clients do not save in accounts that MFIs open as business correspondents (BCs) of a bank. We found that a typical MFI is positioned (viewed in the market by their clients) as a credit service provider and, as such, MFIs do not fit into clients’ mental models of where to save. We discuss how MFIs can turn this situation around using client’s demand for credit and desire to accumulate lump sums as triggers to induce active savings behaviour through MFI-BCs. Such a change in product strategy will require MFIs to focus on branding themselves as savings service providers and to highlight their relationships with respected commercial banks to build trust. MFIs will have to be cautious not to position these savings services as a compulsory requirement, as part of loan insurance or at risk of offset against unpaid credit balances.