The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Committee on “Comprehensive Financial Services for Small Businesses & Low Income Households” headed by Dr. Nachiket Mor has released a report that challenges us all. It is a magnum opus of 265 pages that is surprisingly readable and builds on, and significantly extends, the 2008 Rajan Committee report to the Planning Commission entitled “A Hundred Small Steps: Report of the Committee on Financial Sector Reforms”.
The Mor Committee report is, in the Indian context at least, both visionary and, for many at least, little short of revolutionary in its approach. Small wonder then perhaps that the Economic Times notes, “bankers feel most proposals are either impractical or ambitious”. Are bankers really not just conservative, but also devoid of ambition when it comes to financial inclusion? The evidence suggests so – see for example “Branchless Banking Update: Should We Bank on Phones or the Post?”
“This Report … makes a conscious effort to redress this balance and issues of risks and costs have been kept at the very center in the discussions of each of the strategies for providing better access to financial services to small businesses and low-income households.”
The Committee’s recommendations are firmly market-led approach rather than the top-down, directives that have failed to deliver financial inclusion over the last two decades. The report recognizes that banks have business imperatives that shape their behavior much more strongly than even the most stringent diktat from the RBI or Ministry of Finance. This was most recently highlighted in 2012 when the Ministry of Finance sought to impose a cluster-led approach to driving business correspondence (see MicroSave Policy Brief #7 “Is the Business Correspondent Model in Policy Paralysis?” for a discussion of this episode).
The Committee recommends the removal of many of the provisions that have so hampered bank lending to the poor and made the business correspondent (agent) model so unattractive to banks. So, for example, the Committee recommends the removal of the requirement for banks to price farm loans below Rs. 3,00,000 at 7%, noting, “[from the] perspective of Stability that entails sustainable pricing, banks must be allowed to freely price these loans based on their risk models”. Similarly, the Committee recognizes that banks need to charge low value accounts for their transactions. If they cannot charge, banks will either make a loss on those accounts and/or actively seek to avoid opening/making transactions on those accounts – as we have seen so clearly in the years since the Khan Committee’s report “Financial Inclusion by Extension of Banking Services – Use of Business Facilitators and Correspondents” in 2006. This has been well documented by many including, for example, “No Thrills – Dormancy in No Frills Accounts”. Furthermore, MicroSave research clearly shows that poor people are indeed ready and willing to pay for high quality, convenient financial services – see for example “The Answer is “Yes”—Cost and Willingness to Pay in India”. All this is common sense to the outside world, but for many in India, this may require a revolution in their thinking.
“An important issue behind the reluctance of banks has been the requirement to bundle a number of free transactions along with a basic bank account … it would be important for policy to move away from the notion of forced bundling (which is equivalent to hidden subsidies) to a strategy in which the customer needs to pay for every transaction but has a choice of competitive channels through which she can access her account at an affordable cost.”
The Committee report also makes the argument for a diverse approach to deliver financial inclusion, noting that there have been a series of one size fits all approaches (cooperatives, regional rural banks, SHGs etc.) that have been promoted as cure-all silver bullets. Each has played a role in expanding financial access (we should remember that in comparison to much of the developing world, India’s financial inclusion statistics are enviable), but none have truly delivered. Given the diversity of India, it is perhaps surprising that this point has not been made before – or at least that the need to encourage a wide range of actors and partnerships has not been more clearly articulated in, and supported by, policy. Partnerships leveraging new and innovative technologies such as mobile money and the Aadhaar unique identification system provide tremendous opportunities, see for example “Can Mobile Network Operators Lead the Way for Banking the Excluded? (1 of 2)” and “Can The Unique Identification Authority of India be a Saviour of Financial Inclusion?”
“The danger of developing too specific or prescriptive of an approach towards comprehensive financial services is that it will become very quickly outdated and the design will begin to act as an impediment to change instead of being an enabler. … the best way to proceed would be to articulate broad principles that do not vary with financial or technological innovation but instead have a timeless character.”
However, Professor Sriram of the Centre for Public Policy at Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore and Member, Advisory Council on Financial Inclusion and Payment Systems, UIDAI, in The Mint, suggests that the Mor Committee has put all its eggs in the Aadhaarbasket. This is clearly not the case in the context of credit, where the Committee recognizes the role of NBFCs, microfinance institutions, and self-help groups. However, in the context of savings and (to some extent) risk management or insurance services, it is reasonable to assert that in the current market environment a business case can only be credible if it built on Aadhaar enabled technology. Aadhaar has the potential to remove the extraordinarily high cost of account opening and offers low-cost authentication. So the idea of creating a Universal Electronic Bank Account for all as an integral part of the Aadhaar process is an excellent one. (Of course, encouraging the use of this account will be challenging but by no means, impossible see “The Mor Committee Report – The Demand Side Conundrum”). But it is also reassuring to see the Committee recognize the limitations of Aadhaar in places with low connectivity and suggesting PIN-based authentication as an alternative as well. But it should be noted that the Mor Committee is not wedded to Aadhaar. The idea is not to make Aadhaar mandatory, but rather that it is currently the readiest and enabling platform available and can be leveraged … if tomorrow a better platform emerges, then banks should also consider that.
“The Committee recommends that authentication for the purpose of transactions happen in either of three ways:
a. Fingerprint in combination with the Aadhaar number or the bank account number (Token-less authentication)
b. One-time Password (OTP) in combination with the Aadhaar number or the bank account number (Token-less authentication)
c. PIN in combination with the Aadhaar number or the bank account number (Token authentication)
The Mor Committee has been criticised in the MicroSave LinkedIn Group for focusing on what needs to be done to achieve financial inclusion rather than the details of exactly how it should be done. And Professor Sriram also notes, “The report provides lip service to the last mile and concentrates on financial sector architecture”. But the Committee offers a sound approach to this challenge. After all, it is impossible to detail out the ways to deliver the last mile and each type of financial service provider is likely to have its own approach to doing so.
So long as there is a credible business case, it is fair to assume that the extraordinary Indian entrepreneurial spirit will find a way to deliver convenient and accessible financial services. Indeed, it is much more likely to do so when the business case is clear than when cajoled to do so by the RBI or Ministry of Finance. Now, of course, the excesses of the Indian entrepreneurial spirit were on alarmingly graphic display in the 1980s when many Non-Bank Financial Companies (NBFCs) went bankrupt – an episode seared on the consciousness of all Indian regulators. So while letting a thousand flowers bloom, the regulator will have to keep a close eye on the nursery.
This work is already underway. MicroSave is working with banks in Colombia, Kenya, and South Africa, to name but a few, to develop a suite of savings, credit and insurance products for delivery through these banks’ agent channels. And, of course, the savings and emergency loan facilities offered by Commercial Bank of Africa through M-PESA under M-Shwari are already very popular in Kenya despite some of its limitations and challenges.
There is clearly latent and unrealized demand for financial services amongst low-income households, but to achieve real financial inclusion as defined by the Mor Committee (see box) we will need to work hard to design and provide products tailored specifically for low-income households and for agent-based delivery channels. The Universal Electronic Bank Account will be a good start as a “gateway” to the other products. But we should not under-estimate the challenges (and the opportunities) of creating a suite of intuitive and relevant products to help low-income households manage their finances. Only when these are in place will we see the transaction volumes that both cash in/cash out merchants and sales agents will need to continue to provide their services.

The Direct Agent Hierarchy Model enables the provider to have direct access to agents interfacing with end-user customers. The provider takes responsibility for the operational support and oversight of the agents and ensures overall quality of the agent network. The aspects that service providers control include those which relate to individual agents as well as to the network itself. These attributes pertaining to individual agents that the service providers manage include the agent profile, physical layout of the outlet, stock keeping levels, liquidity, quality of branding etc. The network related aspects pertain to capillarity of spread – for instance, the number of agents in a locality, the factors which determine the presence of an agent in the locality etc.
The Master Agent Hierarchy Model, is often incorrectly labelled the “aggregator model”, and is probably the most popular. In this model, the provider appoints a select number of ‘master agents’ who have proven financial and operational muscle to handle recruitment, operational support and management of field level transaction agents. The earnings of master-agents will be a proportion of the earnings of the agents they manage.
The Matrix Hierarchy Model in its most basic form is a combination of the direct agent and master agent models in a single deployment. Providers manage some strategic agents directly while delegating control of others to master agents. A number of deployments have found the benefit of this structure including Safaricom’s M-PESA.





