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Foresight in a FinTech Forest – Financial Technology Drives a Digital Banking Response

We’ve reached an inflexion point in banking, more pronounced and more fundamental than any which has preceded. The financial technology (FinTech) revolution promises dramatic improvements in customer experience and fundamental changes in how banking is informed and how it is conducted.  Financial institutions must make critical choices if they are to compete in the new digital finance world.

1. Given the pace of change financial institutions can no longer take a passive view towards the digital future. A point made by leading authors such as Chris Skinner in his book: “Digital Bank: Strategies to Launch of Become a Digital Bank”. Today, the number of fully digital banks is growing, the product range that they offer is typically limited but is evolving largely on business to consumer lines. These banks are starting to appear in Africa, after being based mainly in Asia, Europe and America. For traditional ‘brick and mortar’ banks, the question is how best to respond.

2. Foresight in a forest. It’s not easy for bankers to see what is happening, and therefore, how banks should respond; bankers in Africa have asked us – “How should we be concerned about the innovations happening in London or Europe, given our different banking and regulatory environment”. The FinTech world is vast, changing and growing rapidly, this makes it much more difficult to determine digital trends when observing a single market1, a single time-period or a single FinTech solution or type of solution. However, by comparing markets temporally and spatially, and grouping solutions, it is possible to determine tends, and through isolating these to derive insights.

3. There is a growing maturity in successful FinTechs. Two years ago, we would see FinTech ‘solutions’ pass through our offices which seemed to be looking for a problem to solve. Successful FinTechs are built around real, demonstrated customer needs that have a commercial use case, often filling a gap in the market which banks have failed to adequately address.

4. The business case of successful FinTech’s is evolving, to second generation use cases, typically these are evolutions around the core theme. Kopo Kopo, for example, in their first generation, processed payments for merchants and provided a user-friendly merchant dashboard. In later enhancements, Kopo Kopo used data gathered to offer loans to merchants based around their cash flows. After establishing a loyal merchant base Kopo Kopo rolled out QR codes. Today, Kopo Kopo offers their business operating system and intellectual property internationally.

5. Fintech’s struggle financially until they reach scale and/or multiple use cases, though investments are flowing into FinTech companies at an increasing rate – Disrupt Africa for example, reports an 84% increase in African FinTech start-ups securing funding. Nevertheless, the investments required for scaling financial technology offers opportunities for financial institutions to collaborate with FinTechs to build a unique solution for their customer base. Financial concerns can mean that some FinTechs initially opt to target customer segments where a high return can be guaranteed.

6. Beyond the fully digital banks many financial institutions are struggling with how to change. Many changes are not fundamental, but merely digitisations of the customer facing front end. However, this usually implies that aspects of the customer experience are lost, specifically turn-around time. Fast turn-around time invariably means straight through processing and digitisation of as much of the underlying process as is practical.

7. Many banks are poorly structured to exploit data. Data often exists in silos, held in legacy systems, data needs to be liberated so that it can be used. This point is clearly demonstrated when considering a FinTech’s approach to data – Fintech’s often take many more data points than banks in coming to their digital decisions – merging data from multiple sources to improve their algorithms, though sometimes they simply manage data better.  Leading banks are already responding to this challenge, by combining their huge internal datasets with data derived externally, cleaning data and analysing before warehousing it for further analysis and use. The question is whether banks will be nimble enough to exploit their data archives.

8. Bank’s often fight their own internal culture. Fundamental questions exist related to whether banks have the right drive, culture, and people, to support the data driven approach to drive efficiencies and develop and improve products and services based on data.

9. Bank-Fintech collaborations are increasing. Banks frequently sponsor FinTech labs to have the first opportunity to work with or invest in FinTech, for example, in May 2017 Barclays’ opened their flagship start-up incubator at The Rise, as Europe’s largest FinTech co-working site. DBS in Singapore has established its own FinTech innovation centres. The thirteen largest European banks are investing heavily in mature FinTech. Others like Equity Bank, in Kenya collaborated with a mobile network operator to launch a mobile virtual network.

10. Managing the culture divide is the key partnership challenge. However, while partnerships are logically the next steps managing partnerships and bringing vastly different cultures together in a sustainable way is the key challenge. Attempts to bridge this cultural divide are being made by creating platforms bringing together potential partners such as the FMO’s FinTech platform for African Banks.

11. The lack of human touch creates limitations for FinTech solutions as well as opportunities. Despite growing maturity, there is a recognition that solutions designed around the absence of human touch can create limitations on the type of solution which can be successfully delivered – particularly in the context of low income, often illiterate/innumerate communities, and in FinTech lending.

12. FinTech lending has limitations which are still being resolved. FinTech solutions are excellent at disbursing credit, but they suffer when it comes to collections – they simply don’t have the physical footprint of financial institutions. This is one reason why draconian measures are taken by the FinTechs to blacklist customers who fail to pay small loans – FinTech’s offering small loans simply don’t have the mechanisms to cost effectively enforce collection. Because of this inherent limitation millions of people are potentially blocked from accessing future credit because of failing to pay a $10 loan. For these microloans much work is required to consider repayment dynamics, whitelisting mechanisms and consumer education and protection in this space. These lending limitations will become more pronounced for larger loans, particularly those outside a natural repayment structure like a value chain. In the short to medium term, this may define a collaborative space between the FinTechs and financial institutions, or will result in FinTech’s investing in collection mechanisms for larger loans, such as Funding Circle in the UK.

13. FinTechs talk of User Experience – Banks of Customer Service. FinTech’s solution is digital end to end – their point of contact with the consumer is vital, hence they ensure that the interface is very easy to use. Compared with this, financial institutions strive to deliver customer service, which is much broader in nature with the cause of the service issue often opaque. Banks may struggle to replicate FinTech user experience through their own legacy systems.

14. FinTech’s apply Agile approaches to product development. FinTechs usually apply an Agile approach to developing financial services, a core focus in this approach is to learn & fail quickly, innovate the fail again until the solution is perfect. Fintech’s often compare the Agile approach to the Waterfall methodology which is to get everything right first before testing. These approaches are derived from the software development world. In contrast conservative financial institutions pilot test products and services with more rigour, typically preferring to succeed rather than to fail fast. Certainly, financial institutions need to be nimbler in product development. But in our view, a hybrid approach which combines slightly more in depth front end market research, user based pilot testing, and agile approaches can derive products faster and better than either approach on its own. It’s worth noting that the mobile payments doyen M-PESA was pilot tested for 18 months before it was launched, and was considerably more successful that its later – supposedly agile – imitators.

15. FinTech’s exploit social media. FinTech’s are a product of the digital age, much like social media. FinTech’s exploit social media, for communications, for marketing, for data analytics and in the case of some peer-to-peer lending methodologies for determining credit limits through social media contacts. Leading banks are already embracing social media as a key communication channel.

16. Social media is set to exploit FinTech. One of the biggest banking revolutions is set to take place as and when social media/technology platforms exploit their reach to absorb FinTech services – whether this is person to person remittances by WhatsApp, Facebook Bank, Amazon or Alibaba vertically integrating from e-commerce into payments.

17. Policy changes will make it easier for many FinTech’s to compete. Policy changes including biometric identity, eKYC, and open data standards (PSB2) will make it easier for FinTech’s to sign up large numbers of customers with confidence, and in some cases using bank acquired data. There are huge systemic implications – which will flow from this, conferring significant competitive advantages to institutions able to make strategic use of data – of any type.

18. Interest in regulatory sandboxes is increasing. Regulatory sandboxes are applied in the UK and in Singapore, however, regulatory interest in sandboxes is increasing with sandboxes being discussed in Nigeria, by the BNM in Malaysia, by the Bank of Uganda and in other African countries.

19. Compliance is a FinTech’s minefield particularly when spreading across borders. Successful FinTechs can spread across borders relatively easily in the absence of well-defined regulatory environments. However, compliance standards for FinTechs are evolving and change from market to market. A FinTech operating in a low compliance market may find it very difficult to move across markets, as a result successful FinTechs such as Jumo apply the standards existing in a tough reference market. Despite these constraints it is usually much more challenging for a financial institution to move across borders given the regulatory and capital requirements around new banks. An exception to this would be rapid moves from regulators to regulate FinTech market markers to ensure they can be monitored, in areas which threaten their wider central bank roles, such as crypto-currency.

20. Collaboration within the financial sector country by country appears to be increasing. Financial institutions often struggle to collaborate especially in competitive markets. However, what can be seen is strengthening of Banker’s Associations. The re-birth of the Kenya Banker’s Association with new leadership, effective advocacy and lobbying has been well documented. The Uganda Banker’s Association has also revived, and now meets regularly with the Governor of the Central Bank to discuss issues within the financial sector. Banks are coming together to discuss the issues confronting their industry much more readily and systematically than in the past. The question will be whether they can come to any agreement on industry-wide approaches.

In conclusion, the following stands out: Consumer needs are being and can be met in ways previously unimagined, and this is being done through new digital or digitally focused institutions, whether FinTech’s or financial institutions. Given this, financial institutions must make an active choice to participate in a digital future or risk stagnation and decline. This digital future must combine the best that banking and FinTech’s can offer. Realising the opportunities represented by the digital future requires significant changes in institutional culture – and attitude towards data which will see fundamental shifts driven from an executive level. Regulating this digital future represents a similar seismic shift for Central Banks and policy makers worldwide.

1 Websites or their archives such as Irrational Innovations provide useful infographics on FinTech’s operating in different geographies.

How India has Progressed on No Poverty and Reduced Inequalities

Manoj Sharma, Director, MicroSave speaks on how India has progressed on SDG 1, or No Poverty and SDG 10, or Reduced Inequalities. Mr Sharma mentions that the JAM Trinity (Jan Dhan, Aadhaar and Mobile) holds the key to some of the biggest reforms ever attempted in the country.

Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) in Fertiliser – Towards an Efficient Fertiliser Distribution System

Forty-eight-year-old Devashekhar cultivates paddy twice a year. A resident of Guntur district in Andhra Pradesh, India, Devashekar purchases between 300 and 350 kg of fertiliser from retailers in his village. He is among many farmers who have now started to pay market price for fertiliser. “There has been a reduction in overcharging by retailers as we now pay market price. We also get a transaction receipt that indicates the selling price of fertiliser,” he says. Devashekhar remembers paying more than the maximum retail price (MRP) written on the bags of fertiliser before the introduction of the direct benefit transfer (DBT) system in fertiliser1. The journey, however, has not been easy, he recalls. “During the last Kharif2  season, when I went to buy fertiliser, the retailer refused to sell, citing Aadhaar-based biometric authentication as a mandatory requirement for purchase. I had to go home and return the next day with my Aadhaar number (card). Yet I was unable to purchase fertiliser the following day as well because of a long queue of farmers, whose biometric authentication was taking time due to multiple attempts for authentication. I was finally able to purchase fertiliser on the third day, that too after multiple biometric authentication attempts and waiting in queue for half the day”.

Prior to the introduction of DBT, Devashekhar could ask his friends or family members to purchase fertiliser on his behalf but the new system doesn’t provide for this. This adds to his inconvenience but now he understands the purpose behind this step. “The government now records details of every buyer, so diversion and overcharging will certainly reduce,” he adds. It took Devashekhar about eight months to understand and get used to the new system as there was no communication about the programme. Although issues, such as biometric mismatch, authentication failure, and internet connectivity have reduced over time, farmers like Devashekhar end up spending relatively more time than before while buying fertiliser. They also worry about the performance of the system and the on-time availability of fertiliser, especially during the peak Kharif season.

With time, retailers have also become better at operating the new system. Some have even adopted new practices to reduce the time taken to complete transactions. Some retailers end up saving the Aadhaar number in the respective farmers’ mobile phones and also note it in their registers so that the farmers can come to purchase fertiliser directly from the fields without their Aadhaar card and simply authenticate with their biometrics. Some retailers also keep a record of the ‘best finger’ for authentication purposes to improve their chances of successful authentication in the first attempt. This improves the efficiency of the process but raises questions about privacy and security.

MicroSave has been involved in the DBT for fertiliser programme from the beginning and has seen it evolve from two districts in Andhra Pradesh to 14 districts across India. Assessment3  of the programme in February 2017, when only six districts were live,4  helped us to identify key areas for improvement, crucial for the success and national rollout of this programme. These key areas are outlined as follows:

Need for Effective Communication: A strong communication campaign in vernacular, using a mix of Above The Line (ATL) and Below The Line (BTL) communication methods has to be designed to make farmers aware of the objectives and changes. Assessment of the six pilot districts revealed that a majority of the farmers received the information about Aadhaar authentication requirements for purchasing fertiliser only after arriving at the retailer outlet. This leads either to the retailer refusing to sell them fertiliser or to transactions being ‘adjusted’ by the retailers (see box). Moreover, poor communication to farmers allows retailers to continue to overcharge with impunity and leads to the mistaken belief among farmers that the government will somehow transfer the subsidy amount indicated in the (English language) receipt directly into the farmers’ bank accounts rather than to the manufacturer for the fertiliser purchased.

‘Plan B’ for Fertiliser Sales During Peak Season: An ‘early check out’ system to pre-authenticate farmers at designated Points of Authentication (PoA) before they purchase fertiliser can tackle the peak-time transaction load. This would reduce transaction time at the retailer shops. Existing village infrastructures such as Common Service Centres (CSC), Post Offices, Bank Mitrs (BMs), Fair Price Shops (FPS) etc. can be designated as PoAs, where farmers can pre-authenticate the transaction using Aadhaar and book the fertiliser, thus reducing the transaction time on the final purchase day.

Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM): A formal GRM is important when the DBT in fertiliser is rolled out across India. The GRM should also include the following features:

    1. A toll-free number, which should be well-advertised and communicated to users.
    2. The complainant should receive a complaint ID once the grievance is registered.
    3. The complainant should be able to track the resolution status through the complaint ID.
    4. The government should decide the Turnaround Time (TAT) for grievance resolution.
    5. The mechanism should also provide for an escalation/responsibility matrix, which automatically escalates the grievance to the next level in the matrix if it is not resolved within the pre-defined TAT at a particular level.

The need to devise and test solutions for these challenges in the subsidy distribution system before it is scaled-up is essential, as about INR 70,000 crore (USD 11 billion) is budgeted for fertiliser subsidy in the financial year 2017-18. Only time will tell if the government will continue transferring fertiliser subsidies directly to producers or these are interim steps towards complete DBT i.e. direct subsidy transfer to farmer’s bank account.


1DBT in fertiliser is a modified subsidy payment system, where fertiliser companies are paid subsidy only after retailers sell the fertiliser to farmers/buyers through successful Aadhaar authentication via Point of Sale (PoS) machines.

2Kharif crops are cultivated and harvested during the rainy season, which lasts from April to October, depending on the area.

3At the time of research, DBT live districts were those six districts where the government paid subsidy payment to fertiliser companies on actual sales realised through PoS machines. The other 10 districts were dry-run districts, where subsidy payment to fertiliser companies was yet not linked to actual sales via PoS.

4On request from National Institute for Transforming India (NITI) AayogMicroSave conducted a dipstick evaluation in six districts in Andhra Pradesh (Rangareddy, Pali, Una, Hoshangabad, Krishna, and West Godavari), where DBT pilot was running live.

Agent Network Accelerator Research – Pakistan Country Report 2017

The Agent Network Accelerator (ANA) project is a four-year research project in the following eleven focus countries, managed and conducted by MicroSave/the HelixInstitute of Digital Finance. It is the largest research initiative in the world on mobile money agent networks, designed to determine their success and scale. Pakistan is among 11 African and Asian countries participating in this research project, selected for its contribution to the development of digital financial services globally.

The second wave of the survey for Pakistan, funded by Karandaaz Pakistan, investigates how Pakistan’s mobile money market has evolved since the previous wave of the study in 2014. The survey report is based on over 2,000 mobile money agent interviews that were conducted across Pakistan. The research focuses on operational determinants of success in agent network management, specifically the agent network structure, agent viability, quality of provider support, compliance and risk as well as other important strategic considerations. The study also looked at Pakistan Specific Topics such as BVS Regulations and Gender. The survey is designed to provide valuable insights for the digital financial sector in Pakistan and provide recommendations for developing sustainable networks of mobile money agents. This report highlights the key findings on the mobile money agent landscape in Pakistan.

 

Have the Portfolio Diversification Strategies of Kenyan Microfinance Banks Failed?

Since the enactment of the Microfinance Act 2006 in May 2008, there have been marked changes observed in the microfinnce industry in Kenya. Over this period, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) has progressively licensed 13  microfinance institutions to operate as microfinance banks (MFBs). Consequently, the industry has continued to experience positive growth. Since 2012, deposit accounts have grown by 12%, deposits by 184%, and loans by 131%. To achieve this, MFBs employed diversification strategies, targeting new markets by developing new products and services for these new clients segments.

In addition to the microenterprise segment, MFBs in Kenya now target the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) segment with targeted products, such as cash flow and asset loans, savings and current accounts, and fixed deposits accounts. Despite these initiatives, almost all performance indicators in the industry, such as profitability, non-performing loans (NPLs), and portfolio-at-risk (PAR) deteriorated in 2016. To understand this trend, MicroSave analysed[1] the financial performance of five leading MFBs[2] in Kenya over a span of five years. The five MFBs share 95% 0f the market between them[3].

In the past five years, the gross loan book of these five MFBs has grown by 131% to KES 45.7 billion (USD 457 million). In line with this growth, NPLs have also increased by 394% to KES  7.2 billion​ (USD 72 million) and average PAR steadily increasing from 7% in 2012 to 16% in 2016.

The industry has maintained a declining growth in gross loans and deposits and deteriorating PAR in the years under review. In 2015, the industry realised negative growthwhich led to losses in 2016.

With most MFBs holding relatively young SME portfolios, coupled with the fact that they are still stress-testing new systems and structures for this target market, this was perhaps expected. However, the trend still needs to be addressed. With the micro-enterprise portfolio traditionally considered to be less risky, more focus should be placed on stabilising the newer SME portfolio, which carries greater risk. In addition, the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9[4],which comes into effect in 2018, requires the reclassification of loans by making higher provisions to absorb shocks. This may consequently contribute to greater losses in the industry. What, therefore, are the underlying factors that increase these risks among MFBs in Kenya?

Firstly, regulatory factors have affected the MFB sector in the past couple of years. The Central Bank of Kenya, in its mandate, to ensure that financial institutions comply with financial regulations, placed three banks (Imperial BankDubai Bank, and Chase Bank) under receivership between 2015 and 2016. As a result, Rafiki MFB, a subsidiary of Chase Bank, suffered immense reputational damage. Low depositor confidence in Rafiki led to an overall shrinkage in the deposit base by 29% in 2016. Similarly, Rafiki’s loan portfolio also shrunk by 17%. At the end of the fiscal year 2016, the MFB reported a gross loss of approximately KES 461 million (USD 4.6 million) before tax. This has significantly contributed to the industry’s pre-tax loss of KES 337 million (USD 3.4 million) in 2016.The Rafiki factor also lowered customer confidence in the MFB sector, which led to lower growth in deposits, at least for 2016.

5-Year Performance Analysis Of Five Leading MFBs in Kenya

Secondly, the SME business model that MFBs adopted has stretched their institutional capacities and skills. Their collective portfolio diversification strategies in new markets and customer segment (SME) might have proved riskier than estimated. Some of the performance challenges that MFBs face could be attributed to the factors highlighted below.

a.  Investor influence: Many MFBs have resorted to equity and debt financing to adequately grow the lucrative SME portfolio. This came with pressure to generate profits for the stockholders. It led to rapid, large-scale loan disbursement to new client segments in order to absorb the financing. These client segments were those that the MFBs did not have time to build relationships with. At the time of writing, MFBs continue to find the management of this new breed of clients difficult.

b.  Culture: The model and culture of micro credit lending still influence many transitioning MFBs, from credit-only to full-service microfinance banks. The capacity of the SME segment to meet the demands and needs is still under development, both in the governance and operational levels. MFBs are therefore exposed to risks while serving SMEs, both at the credit origination phase and the monitoring phase. This has contributed to the deteriorating quality of the portfolio.

c.   Segmentation: With a wide variety of SME segments targeted, MFBs need more clarity and understanding of the various seasonality and cash-flow patterns associated with each sector.  Lack of this clarity has seen some MFBs disburse construction and mortgage loans in one tranche, or venture into sectors like agriculture and education, thus exposing the MFBs to portfolio risks where the cash flows are irregular.

d.  Inadequate product suites: Most MFBs are not a one-stop shop for their clients. Due to limited capacity, they are unable to offer a combination of linked products as per their clients’ demands. For instance, an SME client with a corporate account would want the convenience of paying its staff online or view their accounts in real-time. Most MFBs can comfortably offer current and fixed accounts to corporate customers.  Salary processing is usually handled by another (commercial) bank because of the MFBs’ limited ATM and agent networks and inability to provide real-time statements. Such SMEs, therefore, end up being multi-banked and multi-borrowed, which hinders their efficiency in loan repayments. Clients tend to be loyal to the institution that serves them with most of their needs hence might not provide real value to MFBs in the long run.

The Way Ahead for the Industry

To capture and even reverse these worrying trends, MFBs in the industry may have to focus on continuous institutional re-invention and capacity-building, from the level of the board to the client-facing staff. MFBs should formulate a detailed strategy that focuses on growing healthy portfolios and outlining risk-mitigation procedures. A customer profiling and segmentation exercise could also be conducted to inform MFBs on risk profiles in each segment targeted, hence improve their lending decisions.

In addition, there is a need to refine lending methodologies and develop a credit-risk management framework for the new segments. A customer relationship management system could also be developed to enhance customer engagement and thereafter boost loan-repayment. Products and services should be reviewed to ensure that they are customer-centric and are able to enhance customer choice, uptake, and usage. For deserving non-performing loans, a restructuring exercise could be conducted, following institutional policy and regulatory guidelines. Please see our publications on issues and solutions in the financial and MSME sector in RwandaUganda, and Malawi for more details.

With the lessons learnt over the past five years, a second transformation in the MFB sector in Kenya may be on the horizon – but that would require hard work and attention to detail.


[1] Analysis based on Annual CBK Supervision Reports and published MFB financials.

[2] KWFTFaulu KenyaSMEPU& I, and Rafiki

[3] Based on a weighted composite index comprising assets, deposits, capital, number of deposit accounts, and loan accounts.