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Is the non-exclusive agent network model paying off in Senegal?

Warimako ! – a Wolof expression translating to “Send me money”– is embedded in Senegalese vernacular, demonstrating the widespread adoption of Over-the-Counter (OTC) money transfers in this market. At the outlet level, agents are not only serving Wari but also other providers such as Joni-Joni, Orange and Tigo. The Helix Institute’s Agent Network Accelerator (ANA) Senegal Country Report, conducted in partnership with UNCDF Mobile Money for the Poor (MM4P), indicates that high levels of non-exclusivity (66%) among Senegalese agents offering competing products brings a great diversity of actors in a booming market. What are the advantages and challenges of the non-exclusive agent network model in Senegal?

The diversity of players

The Senegalese digital finance market is fractured between four major players. Wari is the market leader—in terms of its presence of agents—representing a little over a third of agents in the country (34%), but it certainly does not dominate the digital finance space. Joni-Joni, a third-party provider that launched in 2013, accounts for a quarter of the market presence, followed by two mobile network operators (MNOs) Orange (20%) and Tigo (11%). Financial institutions are thus far not as widely represented in the Senegalese agent network, as Microcred’s and Manko’s share of market presence is less than one percent each. However, this could change. Senegalese financial institutions can take their lead from Kenyan banks that have impressively increased their share of market presence from five percent to approximately 15% between 2013 and 2014, and offer additive—not competitive—services to the existing product suite.

The diversity of players observed in the Senegalese market is rare among ANA markets and is only comparable to Zambia where five major players –MNOs, financial institutions and third-party providers – are vying for a piece of the pie. This diversity is really a key difference between Senegal and leading East African markets such as Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. In these markets, MNOs dominate the landscape most likely because they were able to leverage heavily on their existing distribution network and customer base and thus aggressively grow their market presence first, creating a higher barrier to entry to other players. However, in Senegal, MNOs did not initially leverage their distribution network which cleared the path for third party providers to embark on their journey quite successfully.

Figure 1. DFS Providers’ Market Presence of Agents 

The power of non-exclusivity 

Senegalese agents serve a median of three providers. In fact, the more providers an agent serves, the more transactions they conduct at the outlet level (figure 2). Senegalese agents conduct comparable transaction volumes to the leading East African markets, with a median of 35 daily transactions at the agency level.

Figure 2. Median daily transaction volumes by Exclusivity 

Not only do agents perform higher levels of transactions when they serve multiple providers, but they also earn higher profits. While exclusive agents make a median monthly profit of US$92 (PPP adjusted), non-exclusive agents make substantially more – a median monthly profit of US$146 (PPP adjusted), as the latter are able to diversify their revenue streams without increasing their operating expenses. Because most agents are non-exclusive in Senegal, they make the highest profits among all ANA research countries (figure 3).

Figure 3. Outlet Profitability among ANA Research Countries

Quite interestingly, ANA Senegal demonstrates that over time, agents actually tend to serve more providers. Given the recently issued regulation prohibiting providers to impose exclusivity, transactions and profit levels will most likely keep increasing at the outlet level along with non-exclusivity levels in the near future.

The challenges of non-exclusivity

In Senegal, providers rely on a profitable and dynamic agent network. However the stiff competition we witness at the outlet level means that providers will have to maintain a competitive edge at the agent level, while at the same time ensuring their products are pushed out.

Commission war: in a non-exclusive OTC market, agents have the ability to select which provider they conduct transactions for. This power dynamic puts providers under pressure to offer outstanding agent support and/or loyalty programmes, often in the form of monetary incentives, in order to motivate agents to sell their services and lure new customers to their network. This can inflate the commissions that agents receive from competing providers, and thus also have the adverse effect of increasing an agent’s expectation of their future profits. In fact, only 39% of agents are somewhat or very satisfied with the profit they receive from providers, despite being the most profitable—at the agency level—among ANA countries. This perceived expectation is a challenge that providers will need to tackle.

Ripple effect on tariffs: an agent’s increased commission translates to a steady decrease of a provider’s own margin. If providers keep investing a higher percentage of their revenues back into agent commissions, then this will likely impact cash-in and cash-out transaction fees paid by customers down the line. In a competitive market like Senegal, one in which providers are offering similar products, providers will not want customers to bear the brunt of the commission war and ultimately hurt the expansion of DFS in the country.

Quality of support: in addition to providing agents with monetary incentives, a provider’s ability to win an agent’s loyalty can hinge on the quality of service they offer. However, ANA Senegal data shows that providers have not yet succeeded in delivering efficient support systems – only one-third of agents receive regular monitoring visits. This means two things – firstly, that providers are unlikely to ensure agents are well informed, satisfied and provide a high quality of service to customers; and secondly that providers are blind to many aspects of how their agents operate, as well as what competitors are doing in the area. Improving on these aspects will help providers maintain a competitive edge over other players.

Now what?

The non-exclusive agent network model is paying off in Senegal: Senegalese agents make high levels of transactions and profits, which is typical of a competitive market in which each provider tries to stand out. As competition grows though, providers could consider the following strategies to ensure their competitive advantage—among both agents and customers: 1. Shift competition from the agent level to the product level. This can be achieved by designing a compelling value proposition that meets customers’ needs and preferences; 2. Collaborate on support services to improve the quality of support given to agents.

In our upcoming blog on the Senegalese market, we will examine the innovative approaches providers have employed to stimulate customer usage and draw on lessons learnt from other markets in East Africa and South Asia.

Sabine is a Country Technical Specialist, responsible for the implementation of the United Nations Capital Development Fund Mobile Money for the Poor (MM4P) Digital Finance country strategy in Senegal, Benin and Liberia. In this role, she collaborates with diverse stakeholders – regulators, governments, digital financial services providers – to accelerate the development of digital finance ecosystems and make financial services accessible to the low-income population, women and rural households.

Feeding India’s Poor: Plugging Leakages, Without Doing Any Harm

India’s Public Distribution System (PDS) has long come under fire for its high cost of delivery and susceptibility to corruption and leakages. The attempts to reform in the last decades however, offer hope that leakages can be significantly reduced if dedicated action is taken. This policy brief discusses two distinct and more recent approaches, namely, Direct Benefit Transfers and e-PDS (i.e. Automation in PDS), as undertaken by different states to address leakages. The findings are primarily discussed from the perspective of delivery to all eligible citizens and highlight existing issues with both approaches. These have implications depending on the specific state context and on this basis, recommendations are made to policymakers and implementing agencies.

Know more about the PMJDY account from ‘Chavvani’ – Our financially literate parrot!

The following animation prepared by MicroSave is a part of ePaathshala (Digital School) and aims to educate end customers about the benefits of opening and regularly using the PMJDY account.

Agent Network Accelerator Survey: Senegal Country Report 2015

Based on over 1,200 digital financial services  (DFS) agent interviews conducted between November and December 2015, the ANA Senegal report, funded by UNCDF MM4P Programme, highlights findings on the DFS agent landscape in Senegal covering agent profitability, transaction volumes, liquidity management and other important strategic considerations.

The findings illustrate that the Senegalese digital finance market is fractured between four major players who tend to share agents, thus agents serve a median of three providers. There is widespread adoption of the OTC transaction methodology with money transfers as the anchor product.  High revenues and low operating expenses make agents the most profitable among all ANA research countries. The Senegalese market is facing a watershed moment, as many providers are transitioning to wallet-based products. In this transition, providers will want to maintain agent profitability as well as support its customers—not all of whom may be ready.

Read the full report here.

Low Preference for Cash Transfer in TPDS – What Affects Beneficiary Behaviour?

The cash versus in-kind subsidy transfer (e.g., food, fuel or fertiliser subsidy)[i] has generated much debate all around the globe. However, there is no clarity on which method should be adopted going forward – cash or in-kind subsidies. While both cash and in-kind transfers certainly have an important role in addressing food security, there is no consensus over whether one is better than the other. There are a number of studies that compare in-kind and cash transfers: however, the results are inconclusive. Some studies suggest that in-kind transfer is better as compared to cash transfers, while many others advocate cash transfers.

A cursory look at the issue shows that proponents of cash transfers argue that leakages/inefficiencies are reduced, procurement difficulties are avoided, as are storage and transportation costs, and targeting can be much more focused. While those advocating in-kind subsidy transfers believe that people will consume adequate amount of food grains under an in-kind transfer programme and express concerns related to cash diversion (buying alcohol or putting cash to other uses) in cash transfer programmes. Other reasons cited include inadequate rural banking infrastructure; transaction costs, which are invariably borne by recipients; two trips (at least!) – one to withdraw money and another to buy food grains; inadequate market infrastructure in rural areas; and fluctuations in prices of essential commodities, etc.

In many developing countries, governments are increasingly willing to make direct payments to poor people. Countries such as Indonesia, China, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa have expanded their cash transfer programmes. India has also introduced cash transfers in schemes on a pilot-basis such as the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS), which aims at providing subsidised food grain to low-income families and aims to introduce cash transfers in many other schemes.

The Government of India, on August 21, 2015, issued the Cash Transfer of Food Subsidy Rules, 2015. These lay down the mechanisms for providing cash subsidy instead of supplying food grains through the Public Distribution System (PDS). Under the National Food Security Act (NFSA), the Union Territories (UTs) of Chandigarh and Puducherry rolled out Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) pilots in September 2015. MicroSave conducted three rounds of assessments (baseline, mid-line and end-line) of DBT in PDS pilots in the above-mentioned UTs.

Beneficiary preference for in-kind subsidy

69 per cent and 80 per cent of the sample respondents[ii] in Chandigarh and Puducherry, respectively, do not wish to continue the ongoing cash transfers, and prefer food grain distributed through Fair Price Shops (FPS). Based on our research, we found the following reasons for such preference:

Insufficiency of subsidy amount: The current subsidy amount provided for grains does not reflect local market rates. For example, the market price of rice in Puducherry is Rs. 35 per kg while the subsidy extended under the cash transfer programme is Rs. 23 per kg. In Mahe (Puducherry), people were concerned about inflation (caused by local traders or otherwise). In Malar (Puducherry) they felt that “prices might increase after the government decides the sum of money’’. Aarti in Chandigarh said, “Prices will not be stable in the market. It will be very difficult for the government to give us the appropriate amount.’’

Transaction expenses:  Current subsidy amount does not take into account the costs involved in accessing cash from banks, including transportation, particularly for the old and infirm, and the opportunity cost of wage loss due to travel times and long waits at bank branches. Our field research in Chandigarh and Puducherry showed that the average time spent commuting to the bank and waiting for a transaction is between two and three hours. This adds up to a total cost of Rs. 145 if one were to add opportunity and direct costs.[iii]

Awareness: Low awareness about the rate of subsidy (including its calculation) and the entitlement per individual/family – which causes confusion and anxiety.

‘‘I don’t know what I am getting and what should I get, I just know that I get money every month.’’– FGD respondent, Chandigarh

Self-contribution: People tend to overlook the cost incurred by them while buying subsidised grains from the Fair Price Shop. Mentally, they do not add the amount (typically Rs. 3 per kg for rice and Rs.2 per kg of wheat) to the cash subsidy they receive, as they procure grains from the open market.

Subsidy diversion: Women expressed concerns about diversion of cash subsidy by men – the issue is pertinent to Puducherry, where a majority of transfers (> 70%) were made to the bank accounts of male heads of households. With inexpensive and easily available alcohol[iv] in Puducherry, the perception is strong that men spend a significant part of the subsidy amount for buying alcohol. This is reflected in our assessment; respondents reported that only 34% of the cash subsidy was utilised for buying food grains.

“At least if the money comes to me, I will manage the budget. If he has to withdraw it, I can be sure that part of it will go to drinks since the shop is just next to the ATM”   Female FGD respondent, Karaikal, Puducherry.

In addition to these, we also identified other beneficiary behaviours associated with cash transfers:

  • There is always opposition to and distrust of change. In this case, beneficiaries have to navigate a significant change in the way the state provides them food subsidy – there is resistance to this. This is compounded by teething challenges in the shift from in-kind to cash transfers, and the inconvenience this has caused the beneficiaries. This reflects Status Quo Bias.[v]
  • Beneficiaries tend to avoid options for which they have less or no information. In case of DBT in PDS, many beneficiaries did not know the purpose and entitlements under DBT in PDS. This gap in information flow makes them apprehensive and some of the dislike for cash transfers is driven by the lack of information – highlighting the Ambiguity Effect.[vi] For instance, in Chandigarh, many of the respondents did not know their entitlements under DBT; they were unaware of even the purpose of DBT.
  • Beneficiaries do not consider benefits of cash transfers and tend to forget the problems (of inferior quality and delivery of less quantity than allocated; long queues; and bad behaviour of FPS owners) faced under the earlier system of food grain distribution through FPS. The issues under cash transfer seem larger even as challenges of the earlier in-kind system seem to be forgotten – a classic case of the Recency Effect.[vii]
  • 69 per cent and 87 per cent of the sampled beneficiaries in Chandigarh and Puducherry, respectively, say that the current cash transfer is insufficient to purchase 5 kg of food grains per family member. While this points towards a subsidy calculation system that appears to be flawed, it also points towards some interesting behavioural aspects of clients. Beneficiaries tend to ignore cash contribution that they had to make in the earlier in-kind system, to buy grains. This shows Tunnelling.[viii]

Some of the above-mentioned challenges – real or just perceived, can be addressed through improvements in service quality of the DBT delivery mechanism and raising beneficiary awareness on scheme features. However, it is imperative for beneficiaries to have access to a regular market close to their residence if cash transfer for food is to be successful. Most of the concerns for cash transfers are because of lack of/less information, and poor rural banking infrastructure. These concern areas need to be worked upon effectively so as to gain wider reach and acceptance for cash transfers.

[i] Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) is an Indian food security system. It distributes subsidised food and non-food items to India’s poor. This scheme was launched in India in June 1997. Major commodities distributed include staple food grains, such as wheat and rice, sugar, and kerosene, through a network of fair price shops (also known as ration shops) established in several states across the country.

[ii] MicroSave undertook a study to better understand the implementation of DBT in PDS for the MoCAFPD and sampled 3,805 beneficiaries in Chandigarh and Puducherry.

[iii] Based on focus group discussions in Chandigarh (calculated off Chandigarh’s minimum wage of ~INR 340 for 8 hours of work).

[iv] Puducherry figures in the Top 5 amongst biggest beer, wine and refined/ foreign liquor drinking states and UTs nationwide, as published in 2011-12 consumption data from National Sample Survey Office, India, and quoted as “India’s biggest drinkers”, in a report published in The Hindu, August 23, 2014.

[v] Status Quo Bias: The tendency to defend the status quo. Existing social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives disparaged sometimes even at the expense of self- or group-interest.

[vi] Ambiguity Effect: The tendency to avoid options for which missing information makes the probability seem “unknown”.

[vii] Recency Effect: The tendency to weigh recent events more than earlier events.

[viii] Tunnelling: Devoting a great deal of bandwidth to a single scarce resource, while neglecting other things to make space for the focus.